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The core principles of Islam lay great emphasis on social 
justice, inclusion, and sharing of resources between the 
haves and the have nots. Islamic finance addresses the 
issue of “financial inclusion” or “access to finance” from 
two directions—one through promoting risk-sharing 
contracts that provide a viable alternative to conventional 
debt-based financing, and the other through specific 
instruments of redistribution of the wealth among the 
society. Use of risk-sharing financing instruments can 
offer Shariah-compliant microfinance, financing for small 
and medium enterprises, and micro-insurance to enhance 
access to finance. And redistributive instruments such as 
Zakah, Sadaqat, Waqf, and Qard-al-hassan complement 
risk-sharing instruments to target the poor sector of 
society to offer a comprehensive approach to eradicating 
poverty and to build a healthy and vibrant economy. 
Instruments offered by Islam have strong historical roots 
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and have been applied throughout history in various 
Muslim communities. The paper identifies gaps currently 
existing in Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
countries on each front, that is, Shariah-compliant micro-
finance and financing for small and medium enterprises 
and the state of traditional redistributive instruments. 
The paper concludes that Islam offers a rich set of 
instruments and unconventional approaches, which, if 
implemented in true spirit, can lead to reduced poverty 
and inequality in Muslim countries plagued by massive 
poverty. Therefore, policy makers in Muslim countries 
who are serious about enhancing access to finance or 
“financial inclusion” should exploit the potential of 
Islamic instruments to achieve this goal and focus on 
improving the regulatory and financial infrastructure to 
promote an enabling environment.1 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is voluminous literature in economics and finance on the contributions of finance 
to economic growth and development. The main reason why finance matters is that financial 
development and intermediation has been shown empirically to be a key driver of economic 
growth and development. Finance (financial intermediation) motivates savers to save by offering 
them a range of instruments to fit their financial needs, channels savings to investors and in the 
process broadens investment opportunities, increases investment, ameliorates risk sharing, 
increases growth of the real sector, enables individuals and business entities to smooth income 
and consumption profiles over time, and there is some evidence that through this process it not 
only leads to economic development but it may play a positive role in reducing poverty and 
income inequality.  
Although the linkage of financial development with economic development is 
established, a high degree of the financial development in a country is not necessarily any 
indication of alleviation of poverty in the country.  There is growing realization that in addition 
to financial development, the emphasis should be to expand the accessibility to finance which 
can play a more positive role in eradicating poverty. Development economists are convinced that 
improving access and making basic financial services available to all members of the society in 
order to build an inclusive financial system should be the goal. Enhancing the access to and the 
quality of basic financial services such as availability of credit, mobilization of savings, 
insurance and risk management can facilitate sustainable growth and productivity, especially for 
small and medium scale enterprises. Although the research in this area is at its early stages it is 
already making promising progress. For example, Demirguc-Kunt, Beck and Honohan (2007) 
argue that finance is not only pro-growth, but also pro-poor. 
Despite of its essential role in the progress of efficiency and equality in a society, 2.7 
billion people (70% of the adult population) in emerging markets still have no access to basic 
financial services,
2 and a great part of the them come from countries with predominantly Muslim 
population.  With growing interest in developing a financial system compliant with the Shariah 
(Islamic Law), it would be worthwhile to explore what is Islam’s perspective on financial 
inclusion and economic development.  Islamic finance is growing at a fast pace all over the globe 
as the demand for financial products and services compliant with Shariah keeps growing. 
However, the focus of such financial products and services is on financial intermediation through 
banking and capital markets activities but the availability of financial vehicles catering to the 
poor is either non-existent or still at very early stages.  
This paper argues that the core principles of Islam lay great emphasis on social justice, 
inclusion, and sharing of resources between the haves and the have nots. Islamic finance 
addresses the issue of financial inclusion from two directions—one through promoting risk-
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sharing contracts which provide a viable alternative to conventional debt-based financing, and 
the other through specific instruments of redistribution of the wealth among the society. Both 
risk-sharing financing instruments and redistributive instruments such as Zakah, Sadaqat, Waqf, 
and Qard-al-Hassan complement each other to offer a comprehensive approach to eradicating 
poverty and to build a healthy and vibrant economy. Instruments offered by Islam have strong 
historical roots and have been applied throughout history in various Muslim communities. The 
paper concludes that Islam offers a rich set of instruments and unconventional approaches if 
implemented in a true spirit and can lead to reduced poverty and inequality in Muslim countries 
plagued by massive poverty.  Therefore, the policy makers in Muslim countries who are serious 
about enhancing access to finance or “financial inclusion” should exploit the potential of Islamic 
instruments to achieve this goal. 
Section I briefly discusses the concepts of financial inclusion and economic development 
in the conventional thinking.  Section II provides theoretical background on the Islamic approach 
to financial inclusion and economic development.  Section III examines various vehicles offered 
by Islamic finance to enhance access while section IV discusses main the gaps and challenges of 
implementing such techniques.  Finally, section V offers policy recommendations and 
concluding remarks.  
Section I. Financial Inclusion and Economic Development 
In conventional finance, financial access is especially an issue for the poorer members of 
society including potential, or would be, entrepreneurs. They are commonly referred to as “non-
banked” or “non-bankable” and in the case of potential entrepreneurs they invariably lack 
adequate collateral to access conventional debt financing. While access to finance may be 
important for economic growth, the private sector may not be willing to provide financing to 
some areas because of the high cost associated with credit assessment, credit monitoring and 
because of the lack of acceptable collateral.  
Financial inclusion, a concept that gained its importance since the early 2000s, has been a 
common objective for many governments and central banks in developing nations. The concept 
initially referred to the delivery of financial services to low-income segments of society at 
affordable cost. During the past decade, the concept of financial inclusion has evolved into four 
dimensions: easy access to finance for all households and enterprises, sound institutions guided 
by prudential regulation and supervision, financial and institutional sustainability of financial 
institutions, and competition between service providers to bring alternatives to customers. 
Traditionally, the financial inclusion of an economy is measured by the proportion of population 
covered by commercial bank branches and ATMs, sizes of deposits and loans made by low-
income households and SMEs. However, availability of financial services may not equal 
financial inclusion, because people may voluntarily exclude themselves from the financial 
services for religious or cultural reasons, even though they do have access and can afford the 
services (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2008).  4 
 
What distinguishes use of financial services from access to financial services? To what 
extent is lack of use a problem? Figure 1 below illustrates the difference between access to and 
use of financial services. The users of financial services can be distinguished from non-users, 
who either cannot access the financial system or opt out from the financial system for some 
reason. Within the non-users, first, there is a group of households and enterprises that are 
considered unbankable by commercial financial institutions and markets because they do not 
have enough income or present too high a lending risk. Second, there might be discrimination 
against certain population groups based on social, religious, or ethnic grounds (red-lining). Third, 
the contractual and informational framework might prevent financial institutions from reaching 
out to certain population groups because the outreach is too costly to be commercially viable. For 
example, in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines, it takes more than a month to get a small 
business loan processed. In Denmark, the wait is only a day. Finally, the price of financial 
services may be too high or the product features might not be appropriate for certain population 
groups. While the first group of involuntarily excluded cannot be a target of financial sector 
policy, the other three groups demand different responses from policy makers. In addition, there 
could be a set of users who voluntarily exclude themselves from the system due to conflicts with 
their religious or ethical or moral value system. 
 
Figure 1– Factors of Financial Exclusion 
 
Source:  The World Bank (2008) Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access, A World Bank Policy 
Research Report, World Bank, Washington, DC. USA  5 
 
Development economists suggest that the lack of access to finance for the poor deters key 
decisions regarding human and physical capital accumulation. For example, in an imperfect 
financial market, poor people may find themselves in the “poverty trap”, as they cannot save in 
harvest time or borrow to survive a starvation. Similarly, without a predictable future cash-flow, 
the poor in developing countries are also incapable of borrowing against future income to invest 
in education or health care for children.  
Without inclusive financial systems, poor individuals and small enterprises need to rely 
on their personal wealth or internal resources to invest in their education, become entrepreneurs, 
or take advantage of promising growth opportunities. Financial market imperfections, such as 
information asymmetries and transactions costs, are likely to be especially binding on the 
talented poor and the micro- and small enterprises that lack collateral, credit histories, and 
connections, thus limiting their opportunities and leading to persistent inequality and slower 
growth. However, this access dimension of financial development has often been overlooked, 
mostly because of serious gaps in the data about who has access to which financial services and 
about the barriers to broader access. 
The inevitable trade-off between wealth accumulation and social inequality in the early 
stage of economic development also implies the crucial role of access to finance in social 
equality progress. Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) imply that financial 
exclusion not only holds back investment, but results in persistent income inequality, as it adds 
to negative incentives to save and work and encourages repeated distribution in a society. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) conclude that building a more inclusive financial system also 
appeals to a wider range of philosophical perspectives than can redistributive policies: 
redistribution aims to equalize outcomes, whereas better functioning financial systems serve to 
equalize opportunities. Empirical studies by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) show that 
countries with deeper financial systems experience faster reductions in the share of the 
population that lives on less than one dollar a day. Almost 30% of the cross-country variation in 
changing poverty rates can be explained by variation in financial development. 
Section II.  Concept of Economic Development and Inclusion in Islam 
  Islam is considered a rule-based system which specifies rules for social and economic 
activities of the society. In this respect, economic principles of Islam deal with (a) the rules of 
behavior (similar to the concept of economic institutions) as they relate to resource allocation, 
production, exchange, distribution and redistribution; (b) economic implications of the 
operations of these rules; and (c) incentive structure and policy recommendations for achieving 
rules compliance that would allow convergence of the actual economy to the ideal economic 
system envisioned by Islam.
3 
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Islam asserts unambiguously that poverty is neither caused by scarcity and paucity of 
natural resources, nor is due to the lack of proper synchronization between the mode of 
production and the relation of distribution, but as a result of waste, opulence, extravagance and 
nonpayment of what rightfully belongs to the less able segments of the society.
4  
The concept of development in Islam has three dimensions: individual self-development, 
the physical development of the earth, and the development of the human collectivity, which 
includes both (Mirakhor and Askari, 2010). The first specifies a dynamic process of the growth 
of the human person toward perfection. The second addresses the utilization of natural resources 
to develop the earth to provide for the material needs of the individual and all of humanity. The 
third dimension of development refers to the progress of the human collectivity toward full 
integration and unity. Happiness and fulfillment in a person’s life is not achieved by a mere 
increase in income, but with a full development of a person along all three dimensions. At the 
same time, economic progress and prosperity is encouraged in Islam since this provides the 
means by which humans can satisfy their material needs and thus remove the economic barriers 
on the path to their spiritual progress. Economic transactions are based on freedom of choice and 
freedom of contract, which, in turn, require property rights over possessions to be exchanged. 
It is widely recognized that the central economic tenant of Islam is to develop a 
prosperous, just and egalitarian economic and social structure in which all members of society 
can maximize their intellectual capacity, preserve and promote their health, and actively 
contribute to the economic and social development of society. Economic development and 
growth, along with social justice, are the foundational elements of an Islamic economic system. 
All members of an Islamic society must be given the same opportunities to advance themselves; 
in other words, a level playing field, including access to the natural resources provided by God. 
For those for whom there is no work and for those that cannot work (such as the handicapped), 
society must afford the minimum requirements for a dignified life: shelter, food, healthcare and 
education. 
One of the most important economic institutions that operationalizes the objective of 
achieving social justice is that of the wealth distribution/redistribution rules of Islam. Islam aims 
for just distribution of resources by creating a balanced society that avoids extreme of wealth and 
poverty, a society in which all understand that wealth is a blessing provided by the Creator for 
the sole purpose of providing support for the lives of all of mankind. To avoid a state of extreme 
wealth and extreme poverty, Islam prohibits unconstrained wealth accumulation and imposes 
limits on consumption through its rules prohibiting overspending (israf), waste (itlaf), 
ostentatious and opulent spending (israf). It then ordains that the net surplus, after moderate 
spending necessary to maintain a modest living standard, must be returned to the members of the 
society who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to work, hence the resources they could have 
used to produce income and wealth were utilized by the more able. Islam considers the more able 
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as trustee-agents in using these resources on behalf of the less able. In this view, property is not a 
means of exclusion but inclusion in which the rights of those less able in the income and wealth 
of the more able are redeemed. The result would be a balanced economy without extremes of 
wealth and poverty. The operational mechanism for redeeming the right of the less able in the 
income and wealth of the more able is the network of mandatory and voluntary levies.  
Islam emphasizes financial inclusion more explicitly but two distinct features of Islamic 
finance – the notions of risk-sharing and redistribution of wealth – differentiate its path of 
development significantly from conventional financial industry. 
Redistribution refers to the post-distribution phase when the due share of the less able is 
collected through voluntary and involuntary levies. These expenditures are essentially 
repatriation and redemption of the rights of others in one’s income and wealth. It is the 
recognition and affirmation that the Creator has created the resources for all of mankind who 
must have unhindered access to them. Even the abilities that make access to resources possible 
are due to the Creator. This would mean that those who are less able or unable to use these 
resources are partners of the more able. 
II.1. Inclusion through Risk-sharing 
One of the core economic principles of Islam is the notion of risk-sharing. This is based 
on the principle of liability, which states that profit is justified on the basis of taking 
responsibility, possibly even becoming responsible for the loss and the consequences. This legal 
maxim, said to be derived from a saying of the Prophet (pbuh) that “profit comes with liability,” 
implies that Shari’ah distinguishes lawful profit from all other forms of gain and that entitlement 
to profit only when there is also the liability, or risk, of loss. 
Islam has long endorsed risk sharing as the preferred organizational structure for all 
economic activities, specifically the most comprehensive application of risk sharing and going 
beyond anything put forward by modern theories.
5 On the one hand, Islam prohibits, and without 
any exceptions, explicit and implicit interest-based contracts of any kind and requires mandatory 
risk sharing with the poor, the deprived and the handicapped based on its principles of property 
rights. 
Since the central proposition of Islamic finance is risk-sharing, any debt-based   
instrument that is structured based on extracting a rent (interest) as a percentage of the principle 
that was loaned for a specific time period and without the full transfer of the property rights over 
the money loaned to the borrower, is eliminated from the financial system. One result of this type 
of debt-based transaction is that the risk is borne by the borrower. Rather, Islam proposes a 
mutual exchange (al-bay’) in which one bundle of property rights is exchanged for another, thus 
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allowing both parties to share the risks of the transaction—something which is sanctioned. The 
emphasis on risk-sharing is evident from one of the most important verses in the Qur’an with 
respect to economic relations (2:275).
6  
II.2. Inclusion through Instruments of Redistribution in Islam 
Full compliance with the rules of Shariah (Islamic Law) covering resource allocation, 
production, and exchange, and the distribution of resulting income and wealth not only ensures 
economic development and growth, it also ensures economic justice. The rules ensure that justice 
prevails before production takes place, during the exchange, and in the distribution of resulting 
income and wealth. Justice before production is achieved by ensuring that all members of the 
society have equal opportunities with respect to access to and utilization of resources. This is 
achieved through the rules contained in the framework of Islam’s property rights.
7 Basic axioms 
of property rights in Islam provide a firm foundation for the collectivity’s right of legislative 
mandate that requires transfer from those more able to the less able and the individuals should be 
fully aware that there are members in the society who are unable, for a variety of reasons, to use 
the resources, but still have rights in them. Therefore, returns from the use of these resources by 
the more able must be shared with the less able. All these rights must be redeemed from the 
income and wealth which result from their use. 
Various levies are imposed on the production or the income, to redeem the rights of those 
who are not able to participate in the economic activities. Islam places great emphasis on 
redistribution of income and wealth and legislates institutions for this purpose such as Sadaqat, 
Zakah, and Qard-al-Hassan. It is important to realize that in no way are these levies to be 
considered charity, as often misunderstood by laymen and scholars alike.
8  In the following 
section, we will briefly discuss three main instruments of redistributions including Zakah, 
sadaqat, and Qard-al-Hassan for the poor, or the unbanked. These instruments are envisaged to 
enhance access to financing while addressing equity and contributing to poverty alleviation.  
                                                 
6  The verse states that: “... they say that indeed an exchange transaction (bay’) is like a riba (interest-based) 
transaction. But Allah has permitted exchange transactions and forbidden interest-based transactions,” (Qur’an, 
2:275 ). For further details on risk-sharing aspects of Islam, see Askari, Iqbal, Krichene, and Mirakhor (2011) 
7 See Mirakhor (1989) and Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011). The first axiom of the Islam’s property rights framework is 
that Allah is the Creator and the Ultimate Owner of all property. Man has been granted the right of possession of 
property only during his life time in this world. The second axiom is that the right of possession is a collective right, 
and individuals can only earn priority in the use of these resources. Individuals are to use these resources with the 
full understanding that Allah’s ultimate ownership and the collectivity’s prior right of possession remain intact. 
8 Mirakhor (2004) The fact that the general Quranic terms for these levies, such as Zakah or Sadaqat are translated 
into “charity” is an indication of this general misunderstanding. In fact, Zakah indicates a cleansing of the resulting 
production, or income from the rights of others in them, i.e., Zakah purifies the product or income resulting from an 
economic activity from the rights of others in the surplus. 9 
 
  The first redistributive instrument is Zakah.
9 An individual who earns more than what he 
or she consumes must pay Zakah, which is calculated according to his or her level of net worth 
(essentially a wealth tax). Business capital and housing are exempt from Zakah taxation in order 
to promote investment in capital and construction and to encourage home ownership. It is 
important to note that Zakah, is not a substitute for taxation by the state, which may institute 
other forms of taxation to finance additional social, economic, infrastructural, and related 
programs to attain social and economic goals.  
Obviously, in theory Zakah is to be given willingly, not to be paid grudgingly, if Divine 
Law is to be fulfilled. Its obligations are to the community as a whole: they are to be made 
specifically and directly to the community’s less fortunate members, neither to an 
impersonalized government nor to its revenue-collecting agencies. According to the Qur’an, 
poverty and denial of assistance to the needy is forbidden. The Qur’an goes on to explain that 
material inequalities are not a manifestation of spiritual inequalities. Rather, such inequalities 
should be overcome through human effort and are thus meant to foster brotherhood, again 
stressing the importance of Zakah. 
The second instrument of redistribution is Sadaqat (voluntary social spending). 
Researchers argue that according to Islam, poverty exists not because economic resources are 
scarce, but because they are misallocated, inefficiently managed, unproductively hoarded, and 
unevenly distributed. Independent social spending, according to Islam, is the best possible way 
for members of the Islamic social order to promote a more equitable distribution of wealth and 
resources. Muslims with the financial capacity to donate beyond their Zakah requirements are 
therefore strongly encouraged to further invest in infaq and Sadaqat.  
 The  term  Sadaqat (the plural of Sadaqat) is a derivative of the root word meaning 
truthfulness and sincerity because such contributions or payments are symbolizes the strength of 
the sincerity of a person’s belief (Quran, 2:26; 2:272).  The rationale of Sadaqat payments is 
explained as the expenditures intended for redeeming the property rights of those who are 
excluded from the production cycle for any reason. The payment of such levies is considered a 
contractual obligation between the surplus producer and God—the ultimate owner, the instant an 
individual begins using resources created for all by Him. He is obligated to return to others what 
would have been rightly theirs, had they been able to fully participate in the use of resources in 
production and in exchange. On these grounds, it is argued that these levies cannot be considered 
charity.
10 
                                                 
9 Mirakhor and Askari (2010). The etymological derivation of this important word has been traced to verbs that in 
English translate most closely as ‘‘to be pure’’ or ‘‘to
 be pious.’’ Zakah also signifies virtue in general, as well 
as—in the Qur’an—giving and the pious gift. Thus, Zakah  is seen as an act of purification leading to self 
improvement. Others have emphasized its link to the verbs ‘‘to grow’’ and ‘‘to increase,’’ and have interpreted the 
giving of Zakah as leading to a significant increase of blessings, both of material property in this world and of 
spiritual merit for the next.  
10 Askari, Iqbal, Krichene, and Mirakhor (2011). An incentive structure is designed by Islam by which there is a 
promise of multiple return for Sadaqat. In fact, the Quran promises the return to Sadaqat from God in an increasing 
rate (see verses 265 and 276 of Chapter 2 of the Quran). 10 
 
The third instrument of redistribution is Qard al-Hassan (literally meaning a ‘beautiful 
loan’) which is a loan granted to the needy and is mentioned in the Quran as “beautiful” (al-
hassan).
11 It is a voluntary loan without the creditor’s expectation of any return on the principal. 
Additionally, while the debtor is obligated to return the principal, the creditor, on his own free 
will, does not press the debtor for an exact timing of its return. Again, in the case of Qard al-
Hassan, God promises multiple returns to such a “beautiful loan.” Unfortunately, the full 
potential of this institution to mobilize substantial resources for the empowerment of the 
economically weak or dispossessed has not been realized. While the first two instruments, i.e. 
Zakah and Sadaqat are essentially gifts, Qard-al-Hassan is designed to meet the financing needs 
of the poor and is a loan that has to be repaid. It is, however, a loan without interest and with the 
term of the loan determined by the borrower alone.
12 
  To summarize, Islam recognizes claims based on equality of liberty and opportunity, 
which are reflected in the degree of access to resources, the degree and extent of the ability of 
persons to actualize their potential liberty and opportunity, and the right of prior ownership. The 
right that the less able have in the wealth of those who have greater ability and opportunity to 
produce greater wealth is redeemed through the various levies (Zakah, khums, sadaqat, nafaqa, 
and so on), the payment of which is not beneficence but a contractual obligation that must be met. 
Islam also encourages beneficence over and above these obligatory dues, but these levies are in 
the nature of returning to others what rightfully belongs to them. Shirking from this obligation 
causes a misdistribution of wealth, which Islam considers as the major source of poverty. In the 
morality of property rights, Islam unequivocally considers all individuals entitled to a certain 
standard of life; and it is this entitlement that entails the satisfaction of their claim as a matter of 
equity and justice. 
As we shall see, instruments of Islamic finance enable risk sharing and risk 
diversification through which individuals can mitigate their idiosyncratic risks. Levies—
mandated or otherwise—such as Zakah, Sadaqat and Qard-al-Hassan, enable the idiosyncratic 
risks of the poor to be shared by the rich, thus helping to reduce the poor’s income–consumption 
correlation.  In other words, the poor are not forced to rely entirely on their low level (or no) 
income to maintain a decent level of subsistence living for themselves and their families. It is 
possible that at some point even these levies can be instrumentalized to be included in the full-
spectrum menu of Islamic financial instruments for risk sharing. In that event, Islamic finance 
would become a risk manager for society (Askari, Iqbal, Krichene, and Mirakhor, 2011). 
 
 
                                                 
11  It is speculated that the reason why it is called beautiful is because in all the verses in which this loan is 
mentioned, it is stipulated that it is made directly to God and not to the recipient (see, for example, verse 17, Chapter 
64). Mirakhor (2004) 
12 . A number of verses in the Quran stress the importance of this instrument. The Prophet is reported to have said 
that the reward for qard-ul-hassan is eighteen fold while that for Sadaqat which is charity and does not have to be 
repaid is only tenfold. 11 
 
Section III. Enhancing Inclusion through Risk-Sharing Instruments 
Empirical studies provide strong evidence that the proportion of the Muslim population 
using financial services is less than their non-Muslim counterparts (El Hawary and Grais, 2005). 
Lack of access of the poor to finance is undoubtedly the most crucial factor in the failure to bring 
about a broad-based ownership of businesses and industries and thereby realize the egalitarian 
objectives of Islam. As mentioned earlier, access to finance can be enhanced in Islamic economy 
through two approaches. The first is taking the same route as conventional finance and through 
replicating traditional modes of inclusion such as micro-finance, micro-SME, and micro-
insurance (see Box 1).  This section discusses the issues in each mode of financing and reviews 
how each is implemented to make it compliant with Shariah. The second mode of enhancing 
inclusion is through Islam’s redistributive mechanisms such Zakah, Sadaqat, Qard-al-Hassan, 




III.1. Shariah-compliant Micro-Finance 
In most OIC countries, Islamic financing instruments comprise only a small fraction 
of microfinance supply.  In Syria for example, Islamic microfinance comprised only 3 percent 
of outstanding microfinance loans in 2006. Similar situations are also found in other MENA 
countries (See Figure 2). Since MENA countries are relatively more financially developed than 
the rest of the OIC countries, the figure implies an even lower coverage rate of Shariah 
compliant microfinance in all the OIC countries.  Providers of Islamic microfinance also tend to 
be small in size. 80 percent of the global outreach of Islamic microfinance concentrates in only 
three countries, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. Islamic microfinance products are also 
limited in their diversity, e.g. over 70 percent of the Islamic finance products offered are 
murabaha (cost plus). The narrow range of products offered is continuously excluding low-
income individuals and small enterprises from access to Shariah-based finance. 
Box 1 – Core Conventional Tools to Enhance Financial Access 
Micro-finance: 
Two important problems in access to credit services for households are lack of collateral or steady future 
income and high transaction costs.  Microfinance institutions have tried to overcome these two constraints 
by innovations such as group lending schemes. Conventional literature focuses on how microfinance 
unleashes the productive potential of small and unbankable borrowers.  
Small Medium Enterprises (SME): 
Countries with a higher level of GDP per capita have larger SME sectors in terms of their contribution to 
total employment and GDP. (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2003). As the largest providers of new 
jobs and major source of technological innovation in most countries, SMEs have functioned as the engine 
of growth for both developed and developing economies. As for poverty reduction, SMEs are more likely 
to employ poor and low-income workers then larger firms; sometimes, SMEs are the only source of 
employment in poor regions and rural areas. However, market failures may cause biases against SMEs. For 
example, high risks for cost-searching and coordination failure across sectors always prevent start-ups from 
entering a new market. Thus, industry policies favoring SMEs, such as credit subsidies and tax credits, are 
recommended for developing countries.  
Micro-insurance: 
 (Outreville, 1990; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2002; Beck et al., 2007) provides evidence of a positive causal 
relationship between insurance penetration and economic growth. The policyholder benefits by increased 
access to a wider range of products with increased coverage and greater sustainability; and the partnering 
insurance company has access into a new market without taking extensive marketing, distribution, or 
administration costs. More importantly, the partner-agent model facilitates the pooling of risks between the 
formal and informal sectors. 13 
 
Figure 2.  Microfinance Products offered in MENA 
 
              Source: (Sanabel 2010) 
However, there are some signs that this limited selection may increase: in Egypt, Bank 
Misr plans to introduce Islamic microfinance activities to its 33 Islamic branches, and also 
develop a mudaraba  (profit sharing agreement) product in addition to the murabaha product; in 
Yemen, Tadhamon Islamic Bank opened an MSE division in late 2006; and in the UAE, Noor 
Islamic Bank and Emirates Post Holding Group announced plans to establish a company to offer 
Shariah-compliant financial services to low-income clients. 
13 
Table 1 provides a survey of different implementations of Shariah-compliant microfinance 
institutions in Syria, Bangladesh, Iran, and Indonesia. Although the Islamic microfinance 
projects follow similar concepts of conventional microfinance, including group saving and 
monitoring, targeting female borrowers, etc., two characteristics distinguished them from 
conventional ones. First, Shariah compliant microfinance institutions actively adopted various 
Islamic financial tools, such as trade and project finance, Murabahah, as well as non-financing 
instruments such as Waqf and Qard al-Hassan, in the process of absorbing savings and making 
loans. Some of these institutions also gained funding support from Zakah collection. Second, 
since interest income is prohibited, most institutions charged administrative/service fees plus a 
portion of the profit from the business venture.  Looking back, the innovative combination of 
traditional and Islamic finance has been successful in most cases under study, as suggested by 
the relatively high recovery rate and fast expansion of their scale in recent years.  Despite 
success in implementing Shariah-compliant micro-finance, the practice has not spread as widely 
as one would have hoped.  We discuss some of the challenges in the next sections of the paper.  
                                                 
13 (Pearce 2010) 

















Table 1 – Survey of Islamic Micro-Finance Case Studies 
Paper/ 
Country 
Institution   Purpose  Business Size  Client 
size/volume 








village funds  
The village funds are self-managed and 
autonomous in their decision-making, 
which has included the adoption of 
financial practices consistent with local 
values. 
 
 Between Sep 2000 and Dec 
2002, 22 village funds were 
established.  
 UNDP contributed $370,000 
in equity.  
 Repayment rate as of 31 Dec 
2002 was 99.7%. ROE was 
17% 
 Average loan 
balance per 
borrower/per 
capita GDP is 
61%. 
 
 Till the end of 















RDS is a Shariah based microfinance 
model of poverty alleviating program, 
mainly for the poor woman of the rural 
area of Bangladesh. Target group includes 
destitute women, distressed people, and 
households with less than 0.5 acres of land. 
 Up to Dec 2006,  1,368 Field 
Officers engaged in supervision 
 An investment amount of 
$135 mln 
 118 branches in 8,057 
villages  
 Recovery rate was 99%. 
294,908 
borrowers, 92% 
or which are 
woman. 
Bai-Muajjal, Bai-
Murabaha, Bai-Salam, and 
Hire Purchase under 














Helping poor family to purchase materials 





 As of 2005, the family 
empowerment micro credit 
program has a total outstanding 
of $0.3mln, with a recovery rate 
of 96% 
 SME program has a total 
outstanding of $1.1mln, with a 
recovery rate of 94% 
n.a.  Waqf and Mosque 
properties, cash-Waqf 
certificate, joint-venture 














With the objective of helping low-income 
group through short-run credit grant, GFs 
provide Shariah compliance services to 
individuals who are unable to fulfill banks 
loan collateral requirements and thus were 
deprived from obtaining credit.  
 Total value of loans is $169  
mln  
 Total value of deposits is 
$227 mln  
 60% of the total loans had 

















Finance women producers and farmers of 
agricultural sector with loans under $600 
with the maximum repayment period of 5 
years. 






Qard al-Hassan funds, 
Qard al-Hassan saving 
accounts 
(Kholis, AG 









BMT is a unique Islamic micro finance 
institution established by Indonesian 
moslems to abolish ceti or rentenir (Usurer) 
in Indonesian moslem societies by 
providing many financing schemes for 
helping micro and medium entrepreneurs. 
 
 
 Up to November 2006, there 
are more than three thousands 
BMTs in the country.  
 About 65 BMT's of them are 
located in Yogyakarta.  
 Only 42 BMT which reported 
their performance to PINBUK 
Yogyakarta regularly. 
n.a.  Murabahah contract for 





account, Walimah saving 
account, Wadi ‘ah 
Damanah Aidil Fitri, 









BMT Masjid Al 
Azhar  
 
Serving those under-developed areas. 
Helping in developing productive business 
by promoting saving activity and assist 
financing economic activities in those areas. 
 In 2005, total financing given 
was $0.71 mln  
 Balance of outstanding loan 
was $0.21 mln 
 Total balance of savings was 
$0.23 mln 






BMT Al Kariim 
 
Helping the poorest of the poor, the poor, 
working poor and micro enterprises in the 
informal sector in the Pondok Indah 
neighborhood. 
 In 2005, total financing given 
was $0.38 mln 
 Balance of outstanding loan 
was $0.08 mln 
 Balance of savings was $0.16 
mln 
 Balance of fixed term savings 
was  $0.21 mln 
 In 2005, served 
1,324 debtors 
 5,075 saving 
account 
depositors 
 87 fixed term 
saving users 
n.a. 
                                                 
14 BMT, Baaitul Maal wat Tamwil, or Islamic Savings and Loan Cooperatives 16 
 
III.2. Shariah-compliant SME Financing 
Islamic finance highlights the significance of profit-sharing finance, which can have 
positive economic effects similar to direct investment leading to strong economic development.
15 
Promotion of entrepreneurship and risk-sharing are two key features of Islamic finance and given 
that SMEs require both encouragement to entrepreneurship and risk-sharing, there is a natural fit 
for Islamic finance and SME financing. Islamic SME finance concepts can be seen to provide a 
comprehensive asset-based economic and equitable model that fulfills expectations such as 
social justice and human centered sustainable development. 
Tools required for SME’s finance are not found to be different from the mainstream 
forms for Islamic financing in general. The necessary and sufficient conditions for full 
compliance with Shariah should be satisfied, in terms of risk sharing (lenders and borrowers 
share profits and losses), in addition to the fact that return on capital shouldn’t be fixed.
16 
Financing modes that best suit SMEs include mudarabah (principle/agent) and 
musharakah (equity partnership). Both forms serve a useful purpose: they provide investors with 
high liquidity at low risk. Islamic banks were recently encouraged to provide more profit-sharing 
finance and are developing arrangements to reduce risks and the costs of funding. Many 
innovative examples were provided in Asutay (2011), among which is setting up specialized 
institutions, as well as introducing new consistent products with the aim of reducing risks 
through pooling the funds and establishing Wikalah agencies to perform monitoring and to 
minimize moral hazard.  
However, Shariah compliant SME finance is not limited to these instruments; innovative 
approaches tend to involve more comprehensive financing schemes that mix the aforementioned   
saving as a tool for insurance hedging against future turbulence. Ijarah has been one of the most 
widely used forms of financing SMEs as it reduces the startup cost in addition to providing 
security to lenders.  
  The issue with promoting SME financing is not the availability of appropriate tools but 
the challenge is to provide an enabling environment as we observe in the following sections. 
 
 
III.3. Micro- Takaful, Risk Sharing and Poverty Alleviation 
Takaful is a cooperative insurance mechanism that evolved in the late 1970s in Sudan and 
Egypt. The concept is similar to conventional mutual risk mitigation, in which risk sharing is 
expressed as ta’awuni (mutual protection). Based on the experience of conventional micro-
                                                 
15 For further detail, ee work for Askari, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2008), Chapra (2008) and Asutay (2011), 
16 The three main forms of Islamic finance include murabhah (trust finance), musharkah (partnership finance), and 
mudarbah (markup contract sale). These are in addition to Salam contracts, Ijarah and Qard Hassan, and Awqaf
16. 
Other forms of long term and sophisticated forms include salam  forward purchase credit and istisna  project 
financing.  See also Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011) 17 
 
insurance services and to complement Islamic microfinance products, the first Micro-Takaful 
scheme was established in 1997 in Lebanon. MicroTakaful distinguish itself from Takaful by 
targeting the low-income individuals who are living slightly above the poverty line and usually 
work in informal sectors. As of January 2010 Micro-Takaful providers exist in Lebanon, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Bahrain and Pakistan.
17  
MicroTakaful has long been considered as one of the most promising segments among 
other Shariah-compliant financial products. The main argument is that MicroTakaful can play an 
important role in poverty alleviation through risk-sharing among low-income individuals. Deeper 
insurance penetration leads to faster economic growth.
18  Policyholders benefit by increased 
access to a wider range of products with increased coverage and greater sustainability; and the 
partnering insurance institutions gain access to a new market without taking extensive marketing, 
distribution, or administration costs. More importantly, the partner-agent model facilitates the 
pooling of risks between the formal and informal sectors. Like microfinance, microTakaful helps 
under-privileged people sustain their financial wellbeing, provides them with a feeling of 
togetherness, solidarity, and security, and opens avenues for joint efforts for mutual benefits. In 
addition, as many micro-Takaful institutions raised their funding from Zakah, they can also 
improve the redistribution efficiency and provide a financially sustainable approach to benefit 
the Islamic society at large. 
 
III.4. Islam’s Redistributive Institutions to Enhance Inclusion 
Use of Islam’s redistributive institutions such as Zakah, Sadaqat, Qard-al-Hassan and Waqf 
has enormous potential to enhance access to finance.   
How can Zakah contribute to poverty alleviation? 
The concept of Zakah could be expanded to provide a sustainable source of income for the 
poor. It is seen as a significant tool for promoting financial inclusion and economic growth. If 
‘Zakah’ funds are managed properly, pooling these funds and encouraging the poor/beneficiaries 
to direct the funds towards starting a micro/small business would contribute to a more conducive 
developmental impact and help reduce disparities within the economy.  ‘Zakah’ is also perceived 
as an important tool for continually circulating liquidity in the system. Imposing it on aggregate 
wealth, including gold and silver and idle balances, benefits the system from unutilized resources 
and induces more investment and employment. This in turn paves the way for innovations to 
introduce alternative financial products that would achieve both effective accommodations to the 
nature of micro and small businesses in addition to poverty alleviation. Practical examples could 
include mudaraba agreements with institutional investors and facilitating access to dedicated 
Zakah funds. No doubt, introducing such financial instruments to direct ‘Zakah’ resources 
                                                 
17 (ICMIF Takaful, 2010) 
18 (Outreville, 1990; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2002; Beck et al., 2007). 18 
 
promotes more social equity and equality in a sustainable and productive manner and could 
maximize the value added of such resources.  
Zakah has great potential as the main resource of social spending supporting poverty 
alleviation in Islamic society. The argument is not only theoretically true, but can be supported 
by statistical evidence. Here we used the method adopted by (Shirazi 2006) to estimate the Zakah 
collection in OIC member countries. Besides updating the data source, we also took the potential 
Zakah collation in the form of incoming remittances into consideration.  Table 2 shows   
estimates of the percentage of Zakah proceeds to GDP according to different economic structures 
of selected Muslim countries based on the methodology by (Kahf 1989).  
Table 3 estimates the resource shortfall to fill the poverty gap while Table 4 estimates the 
Zakah collection based on domestic and remittance contributions
19 and determines whether the 
Zakah collection is sufficient to cover the estimated shortfall.  Using this estimation, we find 
supporting evidence that 20 out of 39 OIC countries can actually alleviate the poorest living with 
income under $1.25 per day out of the poverty line simply with domestic and remittances Zakah 
collection.   
This does not mean that it is a totally new source of poverty reduction mechanism using 
Zakah as it is already distributed to the poor in several Islamic countries but we can make an 
argument that proper collection, streamlining, accountability, prioritization, and allocation to 
productive activities can have significant impact on enhancing access and opportunity for the 
poor segment of the society which will ultimately lead to reduction in poverty. 
  
                                                 
19 Zakah collected from remittances is estimated by the 2.5% of the remittances saved domestically (2.5%*domestic 
savings rate*incoming remittances). 19 
 
Table 2 Percentage of estimated Zakah proceeds to GDP in selected Muslim countries 
  Z1
20  Z2  Z3 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2.0 3.9 4.9
Indonesia  1.0 1.7 2.0
Pakistan  1.6 3.5 4.4
Qatar  0.9 3.7 3.2
Saudi Arabia  1.2 3.7 3.4
Sudan  4.3 6.3 6.2
Syria  1.5 3.1 3.1
Turkey  1.9 4.9 7.5
average  1.8 3.9 4.3
Source: (Kahf 1989) 
















































% of GDP 
Group 1: countries with moderate resource shortfall (<=1.0 percent of GDP) 
Malaysia  2009 
384,878.87   27.47  
0.16 0.00 
32.08 0.00   
0.01 0.00 
Kazakhstan  2007 
169,633.06   15.48  
0.26 0.05 
29.39 3.53   
0.02 0.00 
Jordan  2006 
26,142.82   5.54  
0.62 0.10 
25.08 2.53   
0.10 0.01 
Albania  2008 
26,449.68   3.14  
0.85 0.19 
19.50 2.72   
0.07 0.01 
Azerbaijan  2008 
76,730.04   8.68  
1.52 0.25 
96.31 9.90   
0.13 0.01 
Maldives  2004  1,197.43   0.29   2.53  0.14  5.33  0.18   0.44  0.02 
Iran  2005 
643,503.42   69.09  
1.80 0.34 




10,620.40   5.23  
5.46 0.08 




70,017.06   18.51  
3.28 0.20 
443.24 16.89   
0.63 0.02 
Gabon  2005 
17,839.03   1.37  
5.02 0.90 
50.18 5.62   
0.28 0.03 
Turkey  2005 
781,243.40   71.17  
2.64 0.88 
1,371.57 285.74   
0.18 0.04 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep 2005 
333,218.41   77.15  
3.45 0.39 
1,943.13 137.29   
0.58 0.04 
                                                 
20 (Kahf 1989): “Z1 was estimated accordance with the majority traditional view according to which Zakah was 
levied on agriculture, livestock, stock in trade, gold, silver and money. Z2 was based in according with the views of 
contemporary Muslim scholars where Zakah can be deducted from net returns of manufacturing concerns and 
building rents and from net savings out of salaries. Z3 was based on Malikite views, where Zakah base includes 
buildings and other fixed assets except those assigned for personal and family use. 
21  (2)-(6): Data source: World Bank Databank; (7) = 2*(5)*365*(4)/100; (8) = 1.25*(6)*365*(4)/100; (9) = 
(7)/(3)*100; (10) = (8)/(3)*100 
 20 
 
Morocco  2007 
127,848.85   31.22  
3.15 0.54 
718.00 76.93   
0.56 0.06 
Iraq  2007 
94,969.20   29.95  
5.55 0.60 
1,213.32 81.98   
1.28 0.09 
Group 2: countries with Intermediate resource shortfall (>=1.0 percent of GDP and >= 6 percent of GDP) 
Algeria  1995 
129,750.66   28.27  
23.60 1.40 
4,869.54 180.54    28.27 
0.14 
Cameroon  2007 
39,768.07   18.66  
8.21 1.20 
1,118.35 102.16    18.66 
0.26 
Indonesia  2009 
965,571.03   229.96  
15.48 3.62 
25,986.93 3,798.15   229.96 
0.39 
Suriname  1999 
2,018.46   0.46  
11.74 5.90 




46,125.24   21.02  
14.76 4.18 
2,265.26 400.95    21.02 
0.87 
Guyana  1998 
1,538.50   0.76  
6.94 3.90 
38.37 13.48    0.76 
0.88 
Pakistan  2005 
340,262.06   155.77  
18.74 4.35 
21,309.92 3,091.59   155.77 
0.91 
Djibouti  2002 
1,239.64   0.76  
14.58 5.29 
81.20 18.41    0.76 
1.49 
Tajikistan  2004 
8,774.25   6.45  
16.76 5.06 




34,295.23   20.59  
17.79 7.50 
2,674.13 704.61    20.59 
2.05 
Senegal  2005 
18,208.36   11.28  
24.66 10.80 
2,030.84 555.89    11.28 
3.05 
Uganda  2009 
39,813.64   32.71  
21.25 8.26 
5,074.12 1,232.71    32.71 
3.10 
Uzbekistan  2003 
42,757.17   25.57  
33.18 15.04 




1,457.33   1.44  
24.88 12.05 
260.87 78.97    1.44 
5.42 
Bangladesh  2005 
163,728.14   153.12  
33.81 13.08 
37,792.51 9,137.94   153.12 
5.58 
Benin  2003 
9,135.56   7.36  
33.50 15.73 
1,799.43 528.08    7.36 
5.78 
Group 3: countries with severe resource shortfall (>=6.0 percent of GDP) 
Togo  2006 
4,962.81   6.14  
27.92 11.37 
1,252.43 318.77   
25.24 6.42 
Guinea  2007 
9,777.15   9.62  
31.03 14.96 
2,178.00 656.28   
22.28 6.71 
Mali  2006 
12,672.38   12.12  
36.50 18.79 




1,256.42   1.37  
34.83 16.52 
347.96 103.15   
27.69 8.21 
Nigeria  2004 
224,618.00   137.54  
46.89 29.57 
47,080.76 18,556.44   
20.96 8.26 
Niger  2007 
9,248.52   14.14  
30.59 11.92 
3,157.49 768.99   
34.14 8.31 
Comoros  2004 
628.48   0.59  
34.18 20.82 




12,090.91   12.85  
39.26 20.27 




18,885.83   22.38  
42.91 25.18 




2,722.93   4.73  
37.53 20.30 
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Albania  2008 26.45  79.9 21.13  0.38  1.50  1.60 1.44  0.01  y 
Algeria  1995 129.75  98 127.16  2.29  1.12  28.11 1.77  0.14  y 
Azerbaijan  2008 76.73  99.2 76.12  1.37  1.55 64.89 1.82  0.01  y 
Bangladesh  2005 163.73  89.6 146.70  2.64  4.31  18.06 1.62  5.58  n 
Benin  2003 9.14  24.4 2.23  0.04 0.06 5.98 0.44  5.78  n 
Burkina Faso  2003 12.09  59  7.13  0.13  0.05  4.51 1.06  9.83  n 
Cameroon  2007 39.77  17.9  7.12  0.13  0.17 18.53 0.32  0.26  y 
Comoros  2004 0.63  98.3 0.62  0.01 0.01 0.00 1.77  8.89  n 
Cote d'Ivoire  2008 34.30  36.7 12.59  0.23  0.20 17.85 0.66  2.05  n 
Djibouti  2002 1.24  96.9 1.20  0.02 0.01 4.87 1.75  1.49  y 
Egypt  2005 333.22  94.6 315.22  6.30  5.02  15.71 1.90  0.04  y 
Gabon  2005 17.84  9.5  1.69  0.03  0.01 58.35 0.17  0.03  y 
Gambia  2003 1.46 95 1.38  0.02 0.06  11.05 1.72  5.42  n 
Guinea  2007 9.78  84.4 8.25  0.15 0.15 9.68 1.52  6.71  n 
Guinea-Bissau  2002 1.26  42.2 0.53  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.76  8.21  n 
Guyana  1998 1.54  7.2 0.11  0.00 0.01  16.94 0.13  0.88  n 
Indonesia  2009 965.57  88.2 851.63  8.52  6.79  33.76 0.89  0.39  y 
Iran  2005  643.50  99.4  639.64 11.51 1.03  41.09 1.79  0.02  y 
Iraq  2007 94.97  99 94.02  1.69  0.00  0.00 1.78  0.09  y 
Jordan  2006 26.14  98.2 25.67  0.46  2.88  0.00 1.77  0.01  y 
Kazakhstan  2007 169.63  56.4  95.67  1.72  0.22  43.84 1.02  0.00  y 
Kyrgyz Republic  2007 10.62  86.3  9.17  0.16  0.71  0.00 1.55  0.02  y 
Malaysia  2009 384.88  60.4 232.47  4.18  1.13  36.03 1.09  0.00  y 
Maldives  2004 1.20  98.4 1.18  0.02 0.00  46.15 1.77  0.02  y 
                                                 
22 (4) data source: wikipedia.org. (3) (7) (8) data source: World Bank Databank. (8) Savings rate is floored to zero if 
negative 
    (5) = (3) * (4) 
        (6) = (5)*reference ratio of Z1 from 
 
Table 2 
 (9) = ((6) + (7) * (8) * 2.5%) / (3) 
    (10) = Column (10) from Table 3 
(11) = Y if (9) > (10), N otherwise. 22 
 
Mali  2006 12.67  92.5 11.72  0.21  0.21 14.75 1.67  8.20  n 
Morocco  2007 127.85  99 126.57  2.28  6.73  23.37 1.81  0.06  y 
Mozambique  2008 18.89  22.8  4.31  0.08  0.12  1.57 0.41  13.62  n 
Niger  2007 9.25  98.6 9.12  0.16 0.08 0.00 1.77  8.31  n 
Nigeria  2004 224.62  50.4 113.21  2.04  2.27  0.00 0.91  8.26  n 
Pakistan  2005 340.26  96.3 327.67  5.24  4.28  15.21 1.55  0.91  y 
Senegal  2005 18.21  96 17.48  0.31  0.79 14.09 1.74  3.05  n 
Sierra Leone  2003 2.72  71.3 1.94  0.03 0.03 0.00 1.28  16.10  n 
Suriname  1999 2.02  15.9 0.32  0.01 0.00  11.25 0.29  0.61  n 
Syrian Arab  2004 70.02  92.2 64.56  0.97  0.86 20.20 1.39  0.02  y 
Tajikistan  2004 8.77  84.1 7.38  0.13 0.25 0.61 1.51  1.70  n 
Togo  2006 4.96  12.2 0.61  0.01 0.23 0.00 0.22  6.42  n 
Turkey  2005  781.24 98  765.62 14.55 0.89  16.49 1.86  0.04  y 
Uganda  2009 39.81  12.1  4.82  0.09  0.75 12.52 0.22  3.10  n 
Yemen  2005 46.13  99.1 45.71  0.82  1.28  0.00 1.78  0.87  y 
 
Source: World Bank Databank 
 
Qard-al-Hasan as a tool for financial inclusion 
Qard-al-Hasan (QH henceforth) is defined in Shariah as an interest free loan. It is usually 
granted from well off lenders to poor borrowers. It can also be directed from borrowers to 
intermediaries that can redirect it on their behalf to poor borrowers. QH is therefore a non 
rewarding loan (with no expected return) and the borrower is under obligation to repay the loan 
depending on the borrower’s financial capacity to do so. Loan procedures are usually informal 
and social capital is the basic collateral for this instrument. 
The main objectives of Qard al-Hassan could be:
23 
  To help the needy fellow people.  
  To establish better relationship among poor and the rich.  
  The mobilization of wealth among all people in the society.  
  To perform a good deed that is encouraged and appreciated by the Allah (swt) and His 
messenger.  
  To strengthen the national economy.  
  To facilitate the poor to create new jobs market and business ventures by using their 
merits, skills and expertise.  
  To establish a caring society.  
  To eradicate unemployment problem from the society.  
                                                 
23 Please see (Hossain 1955) for a comprehensive exposition of al-qard-al-hasan based on Quran and Sunnah. 23 
 
  It can remove social and economic discrimination from the society, and  
While the conventional microfinance industry has been globally growing at 13 percent per 
annum since early 1990s, only very limited information is available on micro finance institutions 
(MFI’s) operating under QH. A relatively small number of interest-free loans are operating in 
Pakistan (www.akhuwat.org.pk) and there are some small-scale micro-/rural banks in Indonesia. 
However, no organized institutions are known to be operating on the basis of QH except in Iran 
where QH has been utilized effectively to provide finance for the needy and where these 
institutions are widespread throughout the country. 
Also QH funds have been operating in Iran since the Islamic Revolution they have enjoyed 
phenomenal growth and a successful track record. QH funds in Iran, by and large, provide small 
consumer and producer loans and, in some cases, engage in profit-sharing activities with small 
producers and firms, thus supplementing the fund’s capital. These funds are usually associated 
with local mosques or other religious organizations and sometimes with guilds or professional 
associations. The capital is contributed by the more well-to-do who are at liberty to withdraw 
their funds at any time. These funds operate with reasonably low administrative costs since most 
are managed on a voluntary basis by the people within the group. 
A recent survey on QH based finance that has been operating with the objective of helping 
low-income group through short-run credit in Iran shows that there exited 1,229 Qard-al-Hassan 
Funds (Kazem 2007). Total loans amounted to $169 mln, and deposits totaled to $227 mln with 
60% of the total loans had been paid back (please see table 1 for a comprehensive survey on 
literature). 
Conventional micro finance (MF) and Qard-al-Hassan Microfinance (QHMF) have both 
similarities and differences. MF charges interest, an abomination from an Islamic perspective, 
and MF schemes resort to collective punishments for defaulting, yet under QHMF, usually 
donors/subscribers introduce the borrowers and cosign for their loan, yet no collective 
punishment is usually imposed in case of default. On the other hand both instruments target the 
same income groups and they have both effectively contribute to avoiding informational 
problems by relying on peer monitoring, as well as good knowledge of the borrower reputation. 
In addition, neither requires collateral as a prerequisite for a loan. 
QH can also be considered an excellent venue for supporting SME’s and penetrating to 
lower income levels that are deprived of financial resources that is not properly tapped in Islamic 
countries. It provides a reliable source of funding to economic development and targets 
minimizing the lending risk as it build on pooling and social collateral. In addition, it commends 
payback and therefore benefits from the potential recirculation of funds in poor and extremely 
low tiers of the economy. While the social cost of QH funds lies mainly in the opportunity cost 
of using these funds in alternative projects, the social benefits of availing funding to MFI’s at 
zero cost acts a good catalyst for growth and provide an extremely high social benefits through 
creating jobs and generating incomes to the poor, deprived and unprivileged. 24 
 
 
Waqf (endowment) as a tool to enhance financial inclusion 
 Waqf (pl. awqaf) are basically real non perishable properties that are voluntarily donated 
for philanthropic purposes. Awqaf are dominated by fixed property mainly land or buildings, but 
can be applicable also to cash, shares, stocks, and other assets. The concept of Awqaf is a well-
practiced phenomenon in recent times in both the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Awqaf are 
usually named endowments in Non Muslim countries and are providing a wide range of services 
especially in education and community services
24. ‘Awkaf’ by definition needs an institutional 
setup to ensure perpetuity and good governance.. 
In a nutshell, a Waqf, whether in North Africa or India, functions as follows: a founder who 
has accumulated private wealth decides to endow his personal property for a specific, often pious, 
purpose. The amount of the original capital, corpus, the purpose for which it is endowed and all 
the other conditions of management are clearly registered in a deed of endowment submitted to 
the authorities. In this way the privately accumulated wealth of a pious Muslim becomes God’s 
property. The founder strictly stipulates how the annual revenue of the Waqf should be spent. 
This revenue (usufruct) may be allocated completely for a social welfare purpose (Waqf khayri), 
or to a group of beneficiaries.  
The management of the Waqf is entrusted to trustees, whose functions may be fulfilled by 
the founder himself during his lifetime. Thus, there are four major components of any Waqf: the 
three groups of individuals; the founder, the beneficiaries, the trustees and the endowed capital 
itself, or the corpus. The cash Waqf was a special type of endowment and it differed from the 
ordinary real estate Waqf in that its original capital, (asl al-mal) consisted purely or partially, of 
cash. Historically, awqaf was so popular in Islamic countries especially amongst the well off tier 
of the society especially in early seventh and eighth century (ÇIZAKÇA 1998). However, it 
didn’t serve as a sustainable tool for economic development due to some social and political 
turbulence. Sustainability of awqaf institution was closely correlated to the persistence of 
political systems.  
In modern Islamic economics, awakaf are mainly directed to provision of social services 
health, education, municipal, etc.. Awqaf Institutions (AI’s) provided such services in at no cost 
whatsoever to the government given AI’s are properly governed and administrated. On the 
                                                 
24 As per earlier work of ÇIZAKÇA 1998, It is well known that charitable endowments have a history 
considerably older than Islam and it is also very likely that Islam may have been influenced by earlier 
civilizations. Ancient Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome as well as the pre-Islamic Arabs certainly knew of 
charitable endowments. The extent to which Islamic awqaf were influenced by these ancient institutions 
and the extent to which they were the product of the genius of Islam is a question that is still not resolved: 
while Roman origins have been rejected, primarily Byzantine, but also Mesopotamian, Sasanid, Jewish 
and Buddhist influences have been accepted as plausible. Thus, we have a fairly clear situation; Muslims 
were urged strongly to endow their assets in the service of mankind and they knew how to do it from the 
earlier civilizations, which had dominated the geography they had found themselves in. 25 
 
macroeconomic front, AI’s are seen serving the ultimate goal of reducing government spending, 
which contributes to reducing the budget deficit, inflation and government borrowing (other 
things equal).  
This is sensed through setting up a dedicated institutional setup with the purpose of 
providing free services at to the society in order to contribute to maximizing welfare. This is 
efficiently achieved while fully binding to resource constraints as the main operational feature of 
this setup builds on maintaining the property itself and not consuming it through the process. In 
addition to helping achieve inter-generational equity, awqaf help also achieve intra generational 
equity through supplying services to much consecutive generations. This setup needs simple pre-
requisites to ensure optimal social returns; this includes honesty of caretakers, entitled legal 
identity and finally efficient administration. This in turn alters Timur Kuran’s imprecise 
judgment and assessment to awqaf. Kuran thinks the nonprofit setup of awqaf wasn’t intended as 
it was initially proposed for corporatization
25. This is not necessarily right as, awqaf; since its 
inception, were meant to provide non-fee charitable services to contribute to overall welfare of 
society. Another significant feature is that it is intended by construction to facilitate access to 
assets and social services and hence is not by any mean perceived as structural stagnation.  
 
Section IV.  Gaps and Challenges of Enhancing Inclusion through Islamic 
Finance 
Although the OIC countries have experienced rapid economic growth and financial 
expansion during the past decade, low level of financial inclusion is still constraining the 
development of many Islamic economies.  The argument is based on our analysis of two recent 
databases, the Doing Business Report 2011 by the World Bank and the Financial Access Report 
2010 by the CGAP. In order to obtain a comprehensive analysis of the financial inclusion status 
of OIC countries, we calculated and compared the financial access related indicators of OIC 
countries with those of other groups of countries, i.e., GCC, OPEC, OECD, OIC excluding GCC, 
MENA region, low Income countries, and developing countries.
26 We use the data from OECD 
countries as benchmark, because OECD countries have achieved a highly developed financial 
environment after overcoming many similar issues facing OIC countries currently. 
We also separately examined financial inclusion in GCC and non-GCC among the OIC 
countries to see the dispersion of the financial inclusion status among all OIC countries. GCC are 
economically more developed and thus more comparable to its counterparties, such as OPEC and 
MENA region countries, whereas a comparison between non-GCC and low-income countries 
should provide more meaningful implication regarding the financial inclusion gap of the poorer 
                                                 
25 (Kuran 2011) 
26 The low income countries and developing countries are defined by the country classification by the World Bank 
published in January 2011. 26 
 
OIC countries. We also included the developing countries in our analysis as another benchmark 
to see whether the OIC countries are lagging behind the average developing economies on a 
global level in terms of financial inclusion enhancement. 
Below, we discuss main gaps in current implementation of Shariah-compliant micro-
finance, SME, and micro-insurance which are hindering their effectiveness to enhance the 
financial inclusion. 
IV.1. Gaps in Financial Inclusion – Microfinance (MF) 
Strong demand for Islamic microfinance services in OIC countries is not met by the 
supply.  An IFC-commissioned market studies in the MENA region suggest that between 20 and 
60 percent of interviewed microenterprises and low income individuals indicated a preference for 
Shariah-compliant products. For some, the lack of Shariah-compliant products is an absolute 
constraint to financial access, while for others, this is a preference and they continue to use 
conventional financial services in the absence of competitive Islamic ones.
27  This gap is 
supported by statistics in  
Figure 3, which suggests that despite the fact that OIC countries have more MF deposits 
and accounts per thousand adults, values of MFI deposits and loans as percentage of GDP are 
still much lower in OIC countries (0.61% and 0.79%) compared with developing countries (0.78% 
and 0.97%) and low income countries (0.92% and 1.19%).  
Figure 3 Limited scale of Microfinance deposits and loans 
 
 
                                                 


































Box 2 provides more examples of the strong and unmet demand for Islamic microfinance 
in selected OIC countries. 
Source: World Bank Memoriam 
Box 2 – Strong demand for Islamic microfinance in different countries 
  In the West Bank and Gaza, more than 60% of low-income survey respondents 
prefer Islamic products to conventional products, and more than half of them still 
do if the Islamic products come at a higher price. (PlaNet Finance 2007) 
  In Jordan, 24.9% and 32%, respectively, of those interviewed cite religious reasons 
for not obtaining conventional loans. 18.6% of those interviewed rank religious 
reasons as the single most important factor in obtaining a loan. (IFC and FINCA 
2006) 
  In Algeria, a 2006 study by Bankakademie International revealed that 20.7% of 
micro enterprise owners do not apply for a loan primarily due to religious reasons. 
(Bankakademie International 2006)  
  In Yemen, it is estimated that 40% of the poor demand Islamic financial services, 
regardless of a higher price. (source: Phone interview with Executive director of 
the National Microfinance Foundation, Yemen) 
  In Syria, an IFC survey revealed that 43% of respondents considered religious 
reasons to be the largest obstacle to obtaining a microcredit. In addition, 46% of 
respondents who had never applied for a loan stated that religious reasons were the 
primary reason they had never applied. Nearly 5% of current borrowers said they 
would not apply for another loan for religious reasons. (IFC/ The World Bank 
2007)
  
  In Indonesia, according to a 2000 Bank Indonesia report, 49% of the rural 
population of East Java considers interest prohibited and would prefer to bank with 
Sharia-compliant financial institutions. 
  In Lebanon, the success in outreach of Islamic programs relative to conventional 
MFIs strongly suggests that large numbers of poor people prefer Sharia-compliant 
finance.
1 In addition, microfinance practitioners report that many of the Lebanese 
poor refuse financial services unless they are Sharia-compliant. (Hamze 2001) 
  Microfinance practitioners working in certain regions in Afghanistan, Syria, and 
Indonesia report similar results from their market surveys. (The Dubai Islamic 
Bank)
  28 
 
The gap of microfinance in OIC is not only demonstrated by its limited scope, but 
also by the lack of regulation in OIC countries compared to other developing countries. In 
MENA region for example, only Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen have specific 
legislation for Microfinance institutions (Figure 4). Also, according to the CGAP financial access 
database (Figure 5), 68% of the covered 37 OIC countries have appointed agencies to promote 
access to finance in rural areas, while 57% of the countries have dedicated team or unit in charge 
of the task. The ratios are above the developing countries average, but below the low-income 
countries average.  
Figure 4. Microfinance regulation and supervision by region 
 
Source: Peace (2010), M Khaled, CGAP (2010) 



















































Although the Islamic microfinance institutions emerged in different forms and structures 
in different regions (See Table 1), the industry faces similar key challenges across countries.  
First, absence of accounting standards has substantially constrained the expansion 
of  Shariah-compliant microfinance institutions in OIC countries. Although Islamic 
microfinance is developing fast, most central banks have not yet incorporate the special category 
into the existing regulatory and accounting framework. For example, up to Nov 2006, there are 
more than three thousands BMTs in Indonesia, 65 of them are located in Yogyakarta. Only 42 
BMTs reported performance to PINBUK Yogyakarta regularly (Kholis, AG and SH 2007). In 
addition to the accounting standards, information technology assistance, risk management 
supervision, and infrastructure provision are also major concerns of Islamic microfinance 
providers.
28 
Second, knowledge gap regarding Shariah rules among working staff challenges the 
development of many institutions. Since the whole industry is still in its infant stage, most 
employees have little background in Islamic finance before. The knowledge gap increased the 
risk of the institution’s deviation from Shariah rules and deterred Shariah-compliant financial 
product innovation. –Many evidences support this concern. For example, (Ahmed, 2007) found 
that RDS of the IBBL in Bangladesh extensively uses financial tools such as Bai-Muajjal and 
Bai-Murabaha without knowing the Shariah implication of the terms. The knowledge gap may 
also trigger reputational risks of the institutions: found that in Indonesia, society prejudice 
toward operations of BMT that are not in line with Shariah rules may cause trust degradation 
among potential and current clients.  
Third, the Shariah rules increase the complexity of Islamic microfinance products  
and innovation process. The essence of Islamic finance is its close connection with real 
economy. In some cases, this central rule has brought problems for development of Shariah-
compliant microfinance business in certain countries.  In the BMT case in Indonesia, no leading 
competitive commodity can be financed even though the funding channel has been well-
established. In other cases, the strong linkage between Islamic finance and real economy also led 
to promising produce innovation. For example, (Kaleem 2007) argues that Bai Salam contract, a 
deferred delivery contract where delivery of  commodity occurs at some future date in exchange 
of some advanced price fully paid at spot, may help enable 5.44 mln small farmers to gain 
money to grown their crops and feed their families up to the time of harvest. Similarly, (Isnaji 
2007) claims that formulating an “Islamic micro finance version program” under regular 
investment fund will also help coconut farmers in under-banked Muslim areas.  
Fourth, how to attract more Islamic clients to enter the market is a big issue for 
both government and microfinance institutions. While further expansion of the Shariah-
                                                 
28 Notes on risk management issues: Rise and fall of SGGFs in 2003 resulted from their stepwise lending scheme, 
non-separation of depositors from borrowers, and the housing recession. There is no single institution which can 
provide guarantee in the case of liquidity problem for BMTs in Indonesia. (Kholis, AG, & SH, 2007). 30 
 
compliant microfinance would be constraint by the growth of demand for such services, society’s 
understanding of Islamic financial products is still limited.  In order to tap larger proportion of 
potential market, both institutions and governments should exert more efforts to educate low 
income Islamic individuals and invite them to use available services. 
IV.2. Gaps in Financial Inclusion – SMEs 
SMEs in OIC countries still lack easy access to credit on general. As the most comprehensive 
measurement of business environment faced by SMEs across countries, the Doing Business 
Report 2011 shows that OIC countries rank 118 on average, much lower than the average 
developing countries (100) in terms of ease of doing business (See Figure 6). This statistics 
imply that the business regulation and their enforcement in OIC countries are dragging OIC 
economies behind other developing economies, especially in the aspect of providing credit for 
SMEs. If we exclude GCC countries from the OIC countries, the average rank of the group drops 
even lower, approaching to the average level of low income countries covered in the survey. 
Many reasons contributed to the lack of financial access for SMEs in OIC countries. Among 
them, SME transparency, reliable collateral by SMEs, credit information systems, and weak 
creditor rights are the four largest issues emphasized by interviewed banks. (See figure 7). 
 
Figure 6.  Average ranking on the ease of doing business 




Figure 7. Percentage (%) of Banks responding that Obstacle is Very Important or Important for SME 
Financing: GCC vs. Non-GCC 
 
 
Source: (Rocha, et al. 2011) 
 
The detailed statistics shown in Figure 8 suggests that the OIC countries lag far 
behind in all four aspects of ease of getting credit. First, collateral and bankruptcy laws 
protection is weak. The OIC group score 4 in strength of legal rights index, compared with the 
benchmark of 7 among OECD countries. Second, the credit information kept by public credit 
registry and private credit bureau are inaccessible for the public. OIC countries score only 2 in 
the depth of credit information index compared to the benchmark of 5 of the OCD countries. 
Third, both public and private credit information system are still underdeveloped. In OIC 
countries, only 5% of adults have credit histories covered by public registry, while only 6% of 
the adults have credit histories covered by the private credit bureau. For GCC countries, although 
they outperform the OIC average in the overall ranking significantly (43 compared to 118), such 
gap is more likely to be attributed to the shorter time and lower costs of starting a business or 
enforcing contracts, rather than the easier credit environment. In other words, all OIC countries, 
regardless of GCC or non-GCC, face similar challenges in credit provision. 32 
 
  
Box 3 Key Indicators from the Doing Business Report 
  Starting a business: all procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and 
formally operate an industrial or commercial business.  
o  Procedure is defined as any interaction of the company founders with external parties (for 
example, government agencies, lawyers, auditors or notaries).  
o  Time is recorded in calendar days. The measure captures the median duration that 
incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary to complete a procedure with minimum follow-
up with government agencies and no extra payments.  
o  Cost is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. It includes all official 
fees and fees for legal or professional services if such services are required by law.  
o  The paid-in minimum capital requirement reflects the amount that the entrepreneur needs to 
deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months following 
incorporation and is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. 
  Getting Credit: the legal rights of borrowers and lenders with respect to secured transactions 
through one set of indicators and the sharing of credit information through another.  
o  The strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy 
laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending.  
o  The depth of credit information index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, 
scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit registry 
or a private credit bureau. The public credit registry coverage indicator reports the number 
of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with information on their 
borrowing history from the past 5 years.  
o  The private credit bureau coverage indicator reports the number of individuals and firms 
listed by a private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 
years. 
  Enforcing contracts: the efficiency of the judicial system in resolving a commercial dispute.  
o  The list of procedural steps compiled for each economy traces the chronology of a 
commercial dispute before the relevant court.  
o  Time is recorded in calendar days, counted from the moment the plaintiff decides to file the 
lawsuit in court until payment.  
o  Cost is recorded as a percentage of the claim, assumed to be equivalent to 200% of income 
per capita. 
 
Source: The World Bank, DoingBusiness 33 
 
Figure 8. Getting credit  
 
 
Source: Doing Business Report 2011 
In addition to the challenge of access to credit, SME in OIC countries also suffer 
from difficulties to start a business and enforce contracts, which further slow down the life 
cycle of SMEs and becomes obstacles for them to obtain financial investment. Starting a new 
business requires 40 days and 8 procedures on average in OIC countries. The official fees for 
legal procedures and professional services required by law amount to 58% of income per capita, 
and the opportunity is only open to those business with a minimum capital equals to 122% of 





































































































































































































start a new business, and both cost (5% of income per capita) and paid-in minimum capital (15 
% of income per capita) are insignificant (See Figure 9 and figure 10). 
Figure 9. Starting a new business 
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Weak regulatory framework for financial agencies and business disputes resolution 
underscored the strong demand for financial inclusion reform in OIC countries. The 
statistics show that OIC countries fell behind other developing countries in terms of regulatory 
supervision coverage. For example, only 59% of microfinance institutions are under regulation 
compared with the average level of 72% in low income countries (Table ). Current laws are also 
insufficient to provide enough protection for disputes resolution. Take the instance of client 
confidentiality protection, only 68% of OIC countries provide laws to restrict such unfair 
treatment, while 78% of developing countries do (See Figure 11). 
Figure 11. Disputes resolution: provisions in existing laws and regulations to restrict unfair 
treatment 
 
Source: CGAP (2010) 
However, the statistics also shows that OIC countries have been aware of the issue 
and taking actions more actively than other developing countries. According to the CGAP 
survey, OIC governments have been more actively promoting reforms in all aspects of financial 
inclusion, especially in fields of financial consumer protection and microfinance expansion. The 
proportions of countries taking reforms on financial capability (38%) and SME financial access 
(49%) are also higher than those of developing countries (37% and 43%), much higher than low-
income countries (28% and 45%). What is surprising is that non-GCC governments are even 
more active in financial inclusion reforms than GCC governments, especially in microfinance 





































OIC countries  Developing countries OIC‐GCC low‐income countries37 
 
Figure 12. Financial inclusion reform undergoing 
 
Source: CGAP (2010) 
Financial inclusion gap in OIC countries can also be reflected by governments’ 
heavy investment in SME policy reforms. According to the CGAP financial access database 
(Table ), OIC countries are more likely to monitor the level of lending to SMEs through specific 
dedicated agencies than developing countries (73% vs. 48%). Also, 62% of OIC countries 
designated an agency to promote SME access to finance specifically, compared to the figure of 
49% in developing countries. However, the SME lending as proportion of GDP in OIC countries 
is still far behind the OECD level (7.43% vs. 24.47%), which indicates that there is a huge gap in 
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Despite all the reform efforts exerted so far, the SME loans are still small in their 
sizes in OIC countries. Error! Reference source not found. suggests that OIC the total value 
f SME lending in OIC countries is only 7.43% on average, much lower the benchmark of 
Malaysia (17.43%) and OECD (24.47%), and the severity of the issue is similar in both GCC and 
non-GCC countries. The argument is also supported by the Figure 14, which provides the SME 
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Figure 14.  SME Loans/Total Loans (%): MENA Countries 
 
Source: (Rocha, et.al., 2011) 
 
IV.3. Gap – Micro-Takaful 
Despite its large potent in poverty reduction, Micro-Takaful institutions are still 
significantly underdeveloped in OIC countries. UNDP study in 2006 reveals that the low income 
people in Indonesia still rely heavily on informal risk management strategies. Shariah-conform 
insurance that was available to the low income households were reluctant to enter the market. 
Similar to low-income individuals, SMEs are also less covered by insurance services in poorer 
OIC countries. In MEAN region, 34% of SMEs in GCC countries have the access to insurance 
services, while the figure fells sharply to 19% if the SMEs in Non-GCC countries in the same 
region are consider. 
29 
Two reasons may have contributed to the lack of momentum of the market expansion. 
First, the slow expansion of microTakaful may be linked to the fact that microfinance institutions 
in Muslim populous countries are less likely to offer insurance services.
 30Second, some form of 
Takaful model require policy premium to be reimbursed to policy holders if they do not file a 
claim. The AAOIFI’s ruling in 2006 claims that policyholders have the exclusive rights to the 
surplus has held back the penetration of Takaful. This may have played a role in discouraged the 
entrance of new firms. 
 
                                                 
29 (Rocha, et al. 2011) 
30 (Kwon 2010) 40 
 
Section V.   Policy Recommendations and Concluding Remarks 
Financial inclusion is becoming an increasing priority for policy makers around the world 
and there is growing realization that measures should be undertaken to i) stimulate private sector 
investment in favor of low income individuals and SMEs, ii) remove institution and 
infrastructure barriers to help financial service providers to sustainably expand services, and iii) 
encourage product diversification and improved risk management.
31  Box 4 lists key guiding 
principles drafted by G20 for innovative financial inclusion. These principles are good starting 
point for the policy formulation for designing a comprehensive framework to address the issue of 
financial inclusion.  
In this section, we propose five dimensions of policy recommendations that could be 
considered for the enhancement of financial inclusion for countries interested in developing 
Islamic financial system led development in OIC countries. 
                                                 






Box 4 - G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 
 
Innovative financial inclusion means improving access to financial services for poor people 
through the safe and sound spread of new approaches. The following principles aim to help create an 
enabling policy and regulatory environment for innovative financial inclusion. The enabling environment 
will critically determine the speed at which the financial services access gap will close for the more than 
two billion people currently excluded. These principles for innovative financial inclusion derive from the 
experiences and lessons learned from policymakers throughout the world, especially leaders from 
developing countries. 
 
1.  Leadership: Cultivate a broad-based government commitment to financial inclusion to help 
alleviate poverty. 
2.  Diversity: Implement policy approaches that promote competition and provide market-based 
incentives for delivery of sustainable financial access and usage of a broad range of affordable 
services (savings, credit, payments and transfers, insurance) as well as a diversity of service 
providers.   
3.  Innovation: Promote technological and institutional innovation as a means to expand financial 
system access and usage, including by addressing infrastructure weaknesses.   
4.  Protection: Encourage a comprehensive approach to consumer protection that recognizes the roles 
of government, providers and consumers.    
5.  Empowerment: Develop financial literacy and financial capability.   
6.  Cooperation: Create an institutional environment with clear lines of accountability and co-
ordination within government; and also encourage partnerships and direct consultation across 
government, business and other stakeholders.   
7.  Knowledge: Utilize improved data to make evidence based policy, measure progress, and consider 
an incremental “test and learn” approach acceptable to both regulator and service provider.   
8.  Proportionality: Build a policy and regulatory framework that is proportionate with the risks and 
benefits involved in such innovative products and services and is based on an understanding of the 
gaps and barriers in existing regulation.   
9.  Framework: Consider the following in the regulatory framework, reflecting international 
standards, national circumstances and support for a competitive landscape: an appropriate, flexible, 
risk-based Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
regime; conditions for the use of agents as a customer interface; a clear regulatory regime for 
electronically stored value; and market-based incentives to achieve the long-term goal of broad 
interoperability and interconnection. 
 
Source: Pearce (2010) 42 
 
V.1. Policy Recommendation I - Need for Developing Supportive Regulatory and 
Supervisory Framework 
Improved access to finance in many developing countries is constrained by inappropriate 
regulations, a lack of specialist supervisory capacity, and inadequate institutional models in 
general for financial inclusion and particularly for Islamic finance in OIC countries. Despite the 
significance of financial inclusion, it is observed that financial inclusion is still not a priority for 
financial regulators in most of OIC countries. For example, financial regulators in MENA have 
the second lowest degree of involvement in promoting financial inclusion, ahead only of high 
income countries where financial exclusion is at much lower levels (Figure 15). Almost half of 
all the countries covered by the CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 report (48 
percent) have a strategy document for the promotion of financial inclusion, with 90 percent of 
those introduced within the last 6 years.  (Figure 16) 
 
Figure 15. Index of Regulator’s involvement in Financial Inclusion
 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
 
Figure 16. Countries with a Financial Inclusion Strategy Document 
 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
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OIC countries need to develop a regulatory and supervisory framework that supports 
wide financial inclusion based on sound risk management and with sufficient consumer 
protections. During this process, governments and regulators need to take the lead in supporting 
improvements in access to finance, especially through Shariah-compliant financial tools, 
displaying the Leadership called for in the G20 Principles (See Box 4). Financial inclusion, 
especially Islamic financial inclusion, should be considered as a goal alongside prudential 
regulation and financial system stability.  The CGAP and World Bank Financial Access survey 
(2010) of financial regulators worldwide found that regions that include financial access in their 
strategies and mandate their financial regulators to carry such agendas are also the countries that 
reform the most. Regulators with a financial inclusion strategy are more likely to have more 
financial inclusion topics under their purview and more resources and staff dedicated to working 
on these matters.
32 
Practical measures that can be taken by regulators (as has been the case in Indonesia 
and Pakistan) include: licensing Islamic banks, supporting centers for training and certification 
on Islamic financial operations to staff and managers of financial service providers, and 
developing guidelines setting out requirements for licensing and appointment of Shariah advisers 
to rule on Shariah compliance. The political climate for Islamic finance also affects investor and 
lender decisions about whether to offer Shariah-compliant products, and acts as an incentive or 
disincentive to its growth.   
In addition, consumer protection is also increasingly important as access increases, so 
that new customers, and existing customers with access to new services, can take well informed 
decisions about how best to manage and use Islamic financial services. In some countries, 
customers stay away from Shariah-compliant services because of lack of education about 
authenticity and credibility of products.  Consumer protection can help remove such perceptions 
and can lead to enhanced inclusion. Therefore, it is essential that consumer laws and regulations 
are developed and put in place: i) to protect against unfair or deceptive practices ii) to improve 
transparency through disclosure and plain language requirements for products and pricing, in a 
way that allows consumers to easily access to Shariah-compliant products and services, and iii) 
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V.2. Policy Recommendation II - Strengthen Financial Infrastructure for 
Financial Inclusion
33  
Improving financial infrastructure, especially the improvement of current credit 
informational system, should be the priority item in the policy agenda of OIC countries.  
Deficiencies in financial infrastructure are one of the major obstacles for further SME lending in 
MENA region, as confirms by the survey result in  
 
Figure 7. Percentage (%) of Banks responding that Obstacle is Very Important or Important for 
SME Financing: GCC vs. Non-GCC 
 
. Improving financial infrastructure will entail expanding the range of collateral, 
improving registries for movables, and improving enforcement and sales procedures for both 
fixed and movable assets.  It also entails upgrading public credit registries, and more 
importantly, introducing private credit bureaus capable of significantly expanding coverage and 
the depth of credit information.
34   Financial infrastructure improvements will reduce the 
information asymmetry that constrains access to credit and raises the costs and risk of financial 
intermediation.  
Core components of the financial infrastructure such as credit information, 
investors’ rights, insolvency regimes, etc. are essential irrespective of type of financing, i.e. 
conventional or Islamic. For this purpose, it is suggested that, first, regulated financial entities 
should be required to share credit information, ideally through national credit registries. Sharing 
borrower information is essential to lowering costs and overcoming information constraints. As 
mentioned earlier, lack of access to credit information and low coverage ratio of credit history of 
individuals are two main features that contribute to the financial exclusion in OIC countries 
especially for SME financing. By integrating Shariah-compliant products and customers 
information into credit bureaus, the coverage and utility of data in the credit bureaus can be 
improved. Financial institutions of all types can extend access to new customers, while managing 
risks and costs more effectively.  This will also help Shariah-compliant financial institutions to 
expand their funding source and enhance their risk-sharing mechanism, as institution with its 
clients’ credit information available to the public can establish its reputation much easier than 
those with an informal credit history system. 
Second, data on financial inclusion and unbanked markets/customers (especially those 
due to religious reason) is also needed to improve to underpin a sustainable expansion in access 
                                                 
33 For more details, please refer to (Pearce 2010) 
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to finance, as emphasized by the G20 Principle for Financial Inclusion.  Household and 
enterprise-level survey questions can provide governments and regulators with the data they need 
for designing reforms and then monitoring the effectiveness of those reform measures. For 
example, OIC governments can encourage Islamic banks to launch financially inclusive 
accounts, shifting G2P payments (increased transaction volume) through such accounts to 
enhance their viability.   
 
V.3. Policy Recommendation III - Ensure a Level Playing Field for Islamic 
Microfinance, SME, and Micro Takaful 
The lack of Shariah-compliant micro-finance services is constraining financial 
inclusion to a proportion of the population.  The growth of Islamic microfinance will depend 
to a large degree on whether financial institutions can develop sufficiently attractive financial 
products and services, which are competitive with conventional products in terms of pricing, 
transparency, processing time, and burden on the client. This will be determined in part by their 
capacity and systems, but regulators can also provide a more level playing field for Islamic 
microfinance. This extends beyond financial sector regulation to the tax code, as Islamic 
financing that involves additional transactions such as passing on a property title, may have tax 
implications such as capital gains tax, which are not applicable in conventional deals. OIC 
governments should also extend access to a broader range of financial services through existing 
branch networks of Islamic banks, which can offer a unique network of existing outlets as a 
delivery mechanism for Shariah-compliant financial services.  
 
When designing the financial inclusion reform plan, OIC governments should take 
three points into their consideration specifically i) allowing banks to expand access through 
agents and use of technology (e.g. mobile phones), ii) providing a Shariah-compliant finance 
company model for microfinance and microinsurance, and iii) removing interest rate caps for 
microcredit and strengthen customer protection laws. 
 
Competition policy can also contribute to further SME lending.  (Rocha 2010) suggests 
that private banks are more efficient in lending technologies and are able to generate and manage 
a significant SME portfolio, even within weak enabling environments.  The entry of these banks 
into OIC countries could contribute to more SME lending, both directly and through spillover 
effects.  Therefore, the policy implication is to ensure that entry requirements for Islamic 
financial institutions are not overly restrictive and that Islamic banking markets remain 
contestable.
35  In addition, the impact of the entry of foreign banks on Shariah-compliant SME 
lending can be magnified if these new foreign banks have access to substantive credit 
information on potential SME borrowers.  
                                                 
35 Azoategui, Martinez Peria, and Rocha (2010) show that there is a higher rejection of banking licenses in MENA 
than in other regions. 46 
 
 
Governments should play a critical role in promoting an enabling environment in 
which private banks can fulfill their SME finance targets prudently and responsibly.  In the 
case of non-GCC countries, there is huge potential for expanding SME finance, with large 
numbers of smaller enterprises underserved and low levels of bank competition to serve them.  In 
the case of GCC countries, the size of the SME sector may remain more constrained by the 
nature of oil economies, but there is also scope for further SME finance, especially if access to 
finance is also expanded for resident non-nationals. 
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V.4. Policy Recommendation IV - Institutionalization of Islamic Redistributive Instruments 
Islamic finance advocates risk sharing and equity finance, while prohibiting debt 
financing and leveraging. Given the emphasis on social and economic justice and the eradication 
of poverty, we would expect Islamic instruments that targeted to address inequity, such as Zakah, 
khairat,  Waqf, and Qard-al-Hassan, to play an important role if the required institutional 
structures are developed.  Therefore, there is need to formalize or institutionalize Islamic 
redistributive mechanisms designed to empower the economically weak segments of the 
society.
37 
By institutionalization, we mean to build nation-wide institutions and surrounding legal 
infrastructure to maximize the effectiveness of these redistributive mechanisms.  This institution-
building exercise can take place in three steps.  First, is the development of institutions. An 
institution is nothing more that the legalization of the rules of behavior and therefore, would 
require crafting rules pertaining to these instruments as envisioned by Shariah.  The next step 
would be to establish these institutions and to integrate them with the rest of the economic and 
financial system.  In this process, either existing channels of distribution, i.e. banks or post 
offices can be utilized to interact with the customers, or new means can be introduced leveraging 
of new technologies.  Finally, there should be mechanism to ensure enforceability of rules 
through transparent means. 
The objective of institutionalization of redistributive instruments is to formalize and 
standardize the operations to facilitate each instrument.  For example, for Zakah, Khairat, and 
Qard-al-Hassan, a formal network of institutions needs to be developed to collect, distributed, 
and recycle the funds in most efficient and the most transparent fashion.  In some countries, point 
of sale such as Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) or cash dispensing machines are used to give 
                                                 
36 Maddedu provides a review of credit reporting systems in MENA (2010). (Rocha 2010) 
37 (Mirakhor 2004) argues that given the number of poor in Islamic countries, critics argue that, a priori, Islamic 
institutions, which were meant to redistribute income and wealth from the more well-to-do to the weaker segment of 
the society, have not shown the necessary potency in performing their function, and they could be right. It is a 
serious problem that very little effort has been expended by our researchers and scholars in empirically investigating 
the behavior of Muslims vis-à-vis these institutions, i.e., why the latter have failed to achieve the objectives for 
which they were designed, and how the situation could be remedied. Admitting that these institutions have, by and 
large, failed to alleviate poverty in Muslim countries does not obviate the need to consider their potential.. 47 
 
choice to the customers to make donations or contribution at the spot to make it easy for the 
customer to make such contributions.  The financial institution can collect and aggregate funds 
and then disburse to needy through selected channels. 
Several scholars have put forth ideas of formalizing and institutionalizing Islamic modes 
of redistributions through an integrated approach by combining different modes.  For example, 
Elgari (2004) proposes establishing a nonprofit financial intermediary, the Qard-al-Hassan bank 
that gives interest free loan (Qard al-Hassan) to finance consumer lending for the poor. The 
capital of the bank would come from monetary (cash) Waqf donated by wealthy Muslims. Kahf 
(2004) and Ahmed (2003) propose establishing a microfinance institutions based on Zakah, 
awqaf, and Sadaqat. 
Developing a hybrid model or an integrated one is practical and has several advantages. 
Taking micro-finance example, one can envision developing Universal Islamic Micro-Finance 
Structure to construct a portfolio of three basic and traditional Shariah compliant financial 
products, Awqaf, Zakah and micro-Takaful in order to support and foster Islamic Micro-finance 
under a unified framework. Islamic microfinance can be more effective in diverting borrowers’ 
propensity to consume through providing a micro-Takaful mandatory component to the micro 
lending service as the main mitigate for moral hazard. Besides this, charging no interest would 
help mitigate credit rationing, redlining and adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss 1992).  
Although creating such a unified institution may be premature given the present context, in 
this paper we attempt to outline the basic concept of such a singular Islamic MFI by using funds 
from the Zakah and Awqaf, in addition to complementing this with providing micro-Takaful to 
micro enterprises. The IMFIs may use the Zakah fund in disbursing funds to fulfill basic 
consumption needs for the hard-core poor target group in the first place, as on principle no return 
can be realized from Zakah fund and Zakah fund should be disbursed within one financial year. 
Zakah funds may alternatively be directed towards funding small businesses, and support theor 
initiation at no funding cost.  
However, the Awqaf funds may be used as investable fund in providing capital investment 
and working capital financing for the micro-businesses. Such an integrated model may reduce 
the chances of loan default because the basic inherent tendency of the poor to use the loan fund 
for consumption purpose will be met. As their basic consumption needs are covered, the poor 
micro-entrepreneurs may be in better position to focus on their business alone. Moreover, the 
IMFI may initiate financing through different Islamic Shariah compliant modes.  
a) Mitigating Credit Risk: As mentioned above, the innovative operational format of MFIs 
suits the poor, whose lack of physical collateral disqualify them to borrow from traditional 
commercial banks. Waqf-based Islamic MFIs will retain the innovative format of operation of 
conventional MFIs and oriented the program towards Islamic principles and values. Thus, like 48 
 
their conventional counterparts, Islamic MFIs have largely resolved the credit risks through 
social collateral of groups and weekly repayments. 
b) Resolving Moral Hazard Problem: Islamic MFIs have some inherent characteristics that 
can resolve the moral hazard problem faced by conventional MFIs pointed above. The main 
mode of financing used by the Islamic MFIs is murabahah/bai-muajjal or ijarah (leasing). These 
instruments involve real transaction and instead of cash being given out, asset/good is exchanged. 
As a result, the opportunity of diverting funds for non-productive uses other than that requested 
for is reduced, if not eliminated. This increases the profitability of the MFI by decreasing the 
default rate. 
c) Economic Viability: In cases where Islamic MFIs get funds from traditional interest-
based outlets, the financing costs appear to be high. For example, the financing costs of two 
small Islamic MFIs, Noble and Rescue in Bangladesh, were 35.8 percent and 12.5 percent of the 
total expenditures respectively (Ahmed 2002). As the bulk of the Waqf-based Islamic MFIs 
funds will come from Waqf endowment, the financing costs of these institutions will be 
significantly lower than their conventional counterparts. Given the philanthropic nature of these 
funds, no returns are expected by contributors. While Islamic MFIs will pay returns on funds 
coming from external sources like deposits and beneficiary savings, the Waqf component of 
funds will significantly reduce the financial costs and improve financial viability of the 
institution. 
In short, above-mentioned structure is one of several innovative ways to revive Islamic 
institutions of redistribution which has great potential to overcome the problem of financial 
exclusion and to contribute to alleviation of poverty in OIC countries. 
V.5. Policy Recommendation V - Financial Engineering 
  Financial innovation and application of financial engineering have changed the face of 
global landscape in the last three decades.  Although, some of the innovations have been 
criticized and have been the source of volatility in the markets, yet their positive contribution 
cannot be denied.  There is no reason why the financial engineering cannot be used in the area of 
financial inclusion and to enhance the financial access.  One way could be to introduce the 
application of securitization to securitize assets generated by micro-finance and SMEs.  Sukuk 
(Islamic bonds) are a successful application of securitization and working on the same lines, a 
marketable instrument can be introduced to provide funding for much needed Mirco-finance and 
SME financing.  With the introduction of securitization of Micro and SMEs, financial 
institutions would be able to pool their assets and issue marketable securities.  In this way, they 
will share the risks with the market as well as free-up the capital for further mobilization of 
micro and SME financing. 
While sustainability of funding represents a major challenge for Awkaf, researchers 
proposed a hybrid structure that targets integrating Zakah and awqaf to promote microfinance. 49 
 
Sadeq (1995) presents an integrated approach on how traditional institutions of Awqafs may be 
revitalized through proposing innovative Shariah compliant structures. Awqaf certificates of 
different denominations could be issued to raise sustainable funding for Awqaf. Special funds are 
then to be raised for financing economic development. As Awqafs are generally applied on fixed 
assets, such assets are often under-utilized. On the other hand, if cash Awqafs are raised by 
issuing Awqaf certificates, they could be used more efficiently in a wide range of development 
projects. This structure relies on the fact of encouraging the flow if cost-less funding of Zakah, 
that can be directed to underwritings and subscriptions in the pooled funds as a potential tool for 
Islamic microfinance (Hassan 2010).  Yet still, inadequacy of governance and Shariah compliant 
accounting principles to support such structures are the main challenges for widespread 
implementation.  
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Annex – Supporting  Data for Charts 
 
Table 5 Microfinance Regulation and Supervision by Region
38 




All    (%) 
Not regulated  50.0  37.9  47.7 
Supervised only by a bank regulator  30.0  42.7  35.4 
Supervised only by other regulator  20.0  7.8  7.7 
Supervised by both  0.0  11.7  9.2 
Number of countries  10  103  130 
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Table 6 - Microfinance indicators from CGAP financial access database 
  Financial inclusion: 
Promoting access in 
rural areas 
Deposits: 
Accounts per thousand 
adults 
Deposits: 
Value as percentage 
of GDP 
Loans: 
Accounts per thousand 
adults 
Loans: 











SSFIs  MFIs  Coope-
ratives 
SSFIs  MFIs Coope-
ratives 
SSFIs  MFIs  Coope-
ratives 
SSFIs  MFIs 
Malaysia  √  √  2.78  1,146.06 n.a.  0.04  13.71  n.a.  87.26  113.07 19.03 0.63  12.09  0.22 
OIC countries 
average 
68%  57%  30.86  224.11  68.14 3.98  5.33  0.61  24.94  31.00  34.68 2.59  3.62  0.79 
Developing 
countries average 
47%  36%  100.53  216.71  48.93 1.99  4.27  0.78  27.54  25.01  30.14 1.71  3.35  0.97 
Low-income 
countries average 
79%  62%  32.65  18.17  62.44 0.68  1.74  0.92  16.42  8.46  43.87 0.69  1.70  1.19 
Source: CGAP financial access report data 2010 
Note: The CGAP Financial Access Database covers questionnaires sent to 151 economies: 13 in East Asia and the Pacific, 27 in Europe and Central 
Asia, 20 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 14 in the Middle East and North Africa, 6 in South Asia, 40 in Sub- Saharan Africa, and 23 in the high-income 
OECD countries. Among them, 37 OIC countries are covered. For practical purposes, most small islands and economies at war were not included. The sample 
covers more than 94 percent of the world’s population and nearly 98 percent of global GDP. 
Selected questions are presented in the first and second rows of the table. The row for OIC countries means the percentage of OIC countries that replied 
yes to the questions (for Yes/No questions), or means the average value for OIC countries. The same calculation applied to the groups of developing countries, 
OIC-GCC, and low incoming countries. OIC-GCC means OIC countries excluding the GCC countries covered by the CGAP database.  52 
 
Table 7-a Doing Business Indicators Comparison 




Starting a Business 




Cost   (% of 
income per capita) 
Paid-in Min. Capital (% 
of income per capita) 
OIC  118  107  8  40  58  122
GCC  43  78  8 15 5 121
OPEC  110  114  10  43  41  25
OECD  30  56  6 14 5 15
OIC-GCC  128  110  8  44  65  123
Low income   140  119  8 41 108 149
MENA  96  97  8  20  38  104
developing 
countries 
100  98  8 39 32 42
Source: Doing Business Report 2011, The World Bank 
Ease of doing business rank: World Bank index that measures business regulations and their enforcement across countries Index. 
 
Starting a business: all procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. Procedure is defined as 
any interaction of the company founders with external parties (for example, government agencies, lawyers, auditors or notaries). Time is recorded in calendar days. The 
measure captures the median duration that incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary to complete a procedure with minimum follow-up with government agencies and no 
extra payments. Cost is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. It includes all official fees and fees for legal or professional services if such services are 
required by law. The paid-in minimum capital requirement reflects the amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 





Table 7-b Doing Business Indicators Comparison (continued) 
  Getting Credit  Enforcing Contracts 

























OIC  117  4 2 5 6  116 42 667 39
GCC  94  4 4 5 17  117 47 590 20
OPEC  110  4 3 6 10  114 43 594 28
OECD  38  7 5 8 61  37 31 518 19
OIC-GCC  120  4 2 5 5  116 41 677 41
Low income   120  5 1 1 1  117 39 613 58
MENA  116  3 3 5 7  115 44 664 24
developing 
countries 
89  5 3 10 18  99 39 638 33
Source: Doing Business Report 2011, The World Bank 
Getting Credit: the legal rights of borrowers and lenders with respect to secured transactions through one set of indicators and the sharing of credit 
information through another. The strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers 
and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The depth of credit information index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of 
credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau. The public credit registry coverage indicator reports the number 
of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years. The private credit bureau coverage 
indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years. 
 
Enforcing contracts: the efficiency of the judicial system in resolving a commercial dispute. The list of procedural steps compiled for each economy traces the 
chronology of a commercial dispute before the relevant court. Time is recorded in calendar days, counted from the moment the plaintiff decides to file the 
lawsuit in court until payment. Cost is recorded as a percentage of the claim, assumed to be equivalent to 200% of income per capita. 
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Table 8 CGAP indicators for financial inclusion – regulation, disputes, and financial inclusion reforms 
  Under regulation 
agency's supervision? 
(Yes/No) 
Disputes resolution: provisions in existing laws 
and regulations to restrict unfair treatment? 
(Yes/No) 

























































Malaysia    √    √  √  √  √    √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
OIC 
countries  
35%  59%  65%  51%  35%  27%  68%  24%  51%  38%  49%  57%  41%  76%  65% 
Developing 
countries 
44%  59%  57%  70%  38%  42%  78%  16%  42%  37%  43%  49%  42%  64%  51% 




41%  72%  86%  52%  21%  31%  76%  21%  34%  28%  45%  72%  52%  79%  55% 
Source: CGAP Financial Access Report Data 2010 
Note: The CGAP Financial Access Database covers questionnaires sent to 151 economies: 13 in East Asia and the Pacific, 27 in Europe and Central Asia, 20 in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 14 in the Middle East and North Africa, 6 in South Asia, 40 in Sub- Saharan Africa, and 23 in the high-income OECD 
countries. Among them, 37 OIC countries are covered. For practical purposes, most small islands and economies at war were not included. The sample covers 
more than 94 percent of the world’s population and nearly 98 percent of global GDP. 
Selected questions are presented in the first and second rows of the table. The row for OIC countries means the percentage of OIC countries that replied yes to 
the questions. The same calculation applied to the groups of developing countries, OIC-GCC, and low incoming countries. OIC-GCC means OIC countries 
excluding the GCC countries covered by the CGAP database.  
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Table 9 SME data from CGAP financial access database 
  Agency monitors the level of lending 
to SMEs 
Promoting SME 
access to finance 

























Sales  Loan size  Loan 
value (% 
of GDP) 








47.52%  9.90%  26.73% 17.82% 48.51%  37.62% 141.19  9,150,287.27  168,779.94  7.44 
OIC-GCC 
average 




58.62%  3.45%  20.69% 6.90%  72.41%  51.72% 66.43  1,018,377.27  72,356.47  5.58 
OECD  30.00%  86.67%  53.33% 93.33% 33.33%  50.00% 274.00  56,203,661.64 2,080,697.75 24.47 
Source: CGAP financial access report data 2010 
Note: The CGAP Financial Access Database covers questionnaires sent to 151 economies: 13 in East Asia and the Pacific, 27 in Europe and Central Asia, 20 in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 14 in the Middle East and North Africa, 6 in South Asia, 40 in Sub- Saharan Africa, and 23 in the high-income OECD 
countries. Among them, 37 OIC countries are covered.  
Selected questions are presented in the first and second rows of the table. The row for OIC countries means the percentage of OIC countries that replied yes to 
the questions (for Y/N questions), or means the average value for OIC countries. The same calculation applied to the groups of developing countries, OIC-GCC, 
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